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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
On appeal, Olivia Kay Schultz has challenged, inter alia, the failure of the district
court to sua sponte order a mental health evaluation pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522 prior to
sentencing her for burglary. This Reply Brief is necessary to address some of the
State's contentions on appeal with regard to this claim.
First, the State has suggested on appeal that this issue is moot because a
mental health evaluation was performed on Ms. Schultz while she was serving her
second rider. However, as was originally noted in Ms. Schultz's Appellant's Brief, the
case law is clear that such evaluations are to be ordered before sentencing. In addition,
this Reply Brief is necessary to clarify that, contrary to the State's position on appeal,
the mental health evaluation generated during Ms. Schultz's second rider failed to meet
with the criteria for mental health evaluations pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522, and therefore
this information was insufficient to adequately inform the district court's sentencing
determination in any event.
Second, the State has suggested on appeal that the manifest disregard standard
that applies to review of an alleged error in failing to sua sponte order a mental health
evaluation should be conducted solely under review of I.C.R. 32, rather than reading
this provision in cot-rjunction with the stzndards contained in I.C.

9 19-2522 that govern

when a mental health evaluation is mandatory for purposes of sentences. Because the
Idaho Court of Appeals has previously considered, and rejected, this claim, the State's
argument is in error.

Although Ms. Schultz continues to assert that the district court abused its
discretion when it failed to sua sponte order a mental health evaluation for purposes of
sentencing, relinquished jurisdiction over her case, and when the court failed to sua
sponte reduce her sentence upon relinquishing jurisdiction, she will rely on the
arguments made within the Appellant's Brief, and will not reiterate those arguments
herein.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinc~s
The Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings were previously
articulated in Mr. Schultz's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply
Brief, but are incorporated herein by reference thereto.

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed to sua sponte order a mental
health evaluation for purposes of sentencing in this case?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Failed To Sua Sponte Order A Mental
Health Evaluation For Purposes Of Sentencing In This Case
A.

Introduction
While the State has asserted on appeal that there was no error in the district

court failing to sua sponte order a mental health evaluation because one was conducted
at a later date (during Ms. Schultz's second rider review hearing), the State's argument
is misplaced. The ldaho Court of Appeals has already considered and rejected this
claim, as was noted in the Appellant's Brief.

Moreover, the State's assertion

erroneously assumes that the limited examination conducted on Ms. Schultz during her
period of retained jurisdiction was sufficient to meet with the dictates of I.C. § 79-2522.
A review of this evaluation demonstrates that it was insufficient under the applicable
legal standards governing such evaluations. As such, the State's contention that this
issue is moot is meritless.
Additionally, the State in this case has suggested that the standard that this
Court applies on review of whether the district court erred in failing to sua sponte order
a mental health evaluation for sentencing purposes turns exclusively on an examination
of I.C.R. 32. However, this assertion has also previously been raised and rejected by
the ldaho Court of Appeals. The proper standard of review for manifest disregard
incorporates a review of both the provisions of I.C.R.32(d) and of the standards
contained in I.C. § 19-2522, because the statute governing mental health evaluations
sets forth the circumstances under which the district court is required to exercise its

discretion in favor of obtaining a mental health evaluation, as authorized under the court
rule.
B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Failed To Sua Sponfe Order A
Mental Health Evaluation For Purposes Of Sentencincl In This Case
1.

The Issue Reqardina The District Court's Failure To Sua Sponfe Order A
Mental Health Evaluation For Purposes Of Sentencinq Is Not Moot In This

Case
The State has asserted, in response to Ms. Schultz's claim regarding the failure
of the district court to sua sponte order a mental health evaluation at sentencing, that
this issue is moot because a mental health evaluation was produced while Ms. Schutlz
was serving her second period of retained jurisdiction.
However, this argument ignores prior decisions from the ldaho Court of Appeals
that have rejected this exact claim.

As was originally set forth in Ms. Schultz's

Appellant's Brief, prior case law makes clear that mental health evaluations that are
mandated under I.C. § 19-2522 must be conducted prior to sentencing. See Sfafe v.
Coonfs, 137 ldaho 150, 153, 44 P.3d 1205, 1208 (Ct. App. 2002) (see also Appellant's
Brief, pp.10-I I.)

In addition, the ldaho Court of Appeals has also considered and

rejected the propriety of the district court waiting until a defendant is serving his or her
period of retained jurisdiction before ordering a psychological evaluation under
i.C. 3 19-2522.

Stafe v. Banburry, 145 Idaho 265, 268-269, 175 P.3d 63C, 534

(Ct. App. 2007). The State fails to acknowledge this case law, much less provide this
Court with any reason to depart from this established precedent.
Even in absence of the case law indicating that I.C. § 19-2522 requires that
mental health evaluations be ordered prior to sentencing, the State still could not

establish that issue of the district court's failure to order a proper mental health
evaluation was moot. This is because the evaluation conducted during Ms. Schultz's
second rider was inadequate to meet the standards for such evaluations under
I.C. 3 19-2522. The case law governing mental health evaluations makes clear that
these evaluations must be adequate to meet with the criteria set forth in I.C. § 19-2522.
See, e.g., Stafe v. Pearson, 108 Idaho 889, 890, 702 P.2d 927, 928 (Ct. App. 1985).
The observations by the court in Pearson are instructive on this point:
The more crucial issue before the court, in our view, relates to the
inadequacy of the psychological evaluation. We agree with defendant
Pearson's assertion that the evaluation, as submitted in this case, failed to
fulfill the intent and spirit of the statute authorizing such evaluations. We
find that the evaluation, which is part of the exhibits herein, merely gives
conclusory statements to the effect that the defendant is an alcoholic with
an anti-social personality and violent tendencies. The evaluation does not
explain upon what tests or procedures these conclusions are based. It
tends to reflect only a social interview with claimant, rather than a fullscale psychological evaluation.
Id. In view of the gross deficiencies of the mental health evaluation that was produced

in Pearson, the Court of Appeals ruled that this evaluation was insufficient to provide the
district court with sufficient information "on which to make an educated, reasoned,
appropriate sentencing decision." Id, at 891, 702 P.2d at 929.
Contrary to the State's assertion, the mere fact that a document purporting to be
a mental health evaluation was subsequently produced for the district court does not
mean that this document is sufficient for purposes of i.C. § 19-2522. And a review of
the evaluation conducted during Ms. Schultz's second rider demonstrates that it suffers
from the exact deficiencies found to render the evaluation inadequate in Pearson.
The mental health evaluation referred to by the State was attached to
Ms. Schultz's addendum to the presentence evaluation that was dated December 10,

2007. (Respondent's Brief, p.8.) As an initial matter, this evaluation appears to have
been conducted by a licensed social worker, and not a psychiatrist or a licensed
psychologist who would be in a position to engage in appropriate diagnostics. See
I.C. § 19-2522(1). There is no description of what psychometrics or other diagnostic
methods that were employed in conducting the evaluation. See I.C. § 19-2522(3)(a).
The "evaluation" appears to rely entirely on an interview with Ms. Schultz and other
employees at the correctional center and a review of Ms. Schultz's presentence
investigation report. (See Mental Health Evaluation pp.1-2.) There is no diagnosis or
evaluation of any of Ms. Schultz's mental conditions, although the report does describe
some of the maladaptive behaviors that Ms. Schultz has exhibited. See I.C.
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19-

2522(3)(b).
Because there was no diagnosis provided for Ms. Schultz's mental health
conditions (presumably because the evaluator does not appear to be qualified to make
medical diagnoses of this sort), there is likewise no analysis of the degree to which any
of Ms. Schultz's mental conditions impacted her level of impairment or may have
contributed to her underlying offense. See I.C. 19-2522(3)(c).
Because there was no meaningful psychological diagnoses that were
undertaken, the district court was similarly left with no information regarding what
potential treatments were available for Ms. Schultz's mental conditions, nor with an
analysis of the relative risks or benefits of treatment or nontreatment. See I.C. fj§192522(3)(d), (e). In fact, the only statutory factor addressed by this evaluation was the
social worker's own beliefs regarding the potential risk of danger should Ms. Schultz be
released into the community. See I.C. $$ 19-2522(3)(f). And this conclusion is of

minimal import given that it was the product largely of social interviews rather than being
informed by a full-scale psychological evaluation. See Pearson, 108 ldaho at 890, 702
P.2d at 928.
In sum, the State's arguments regarding mootness have previously been
considered and rejected in prior cases -the mandate of I.C. § 19-2522 is one that must
be fulfilled prior to sentencing in those cases where a mental health evaluation is
required. Moreover, even if this were not the case, the evaluation provided to the
district court fails to meet virtually every criteria established for such evaluations, and
therefore the State's suggestion that this evaluation was sufficient is without merit.
2.

The State Articulates The Incorrect Leqal Standards For Appellate Review
Of An Assertion That The District Court Erred In Failinq To Sua Sponte
Order A Mental Health Evaluation For Purposes Of Sentencing

In this case, the State appears to argue that this Court's review of whether the
district court acted in manifest disregard of I.C.R. 32 in the context of the failure to order
a mental health evaluation is divorced from a review of whether a mental health
evaluation was required for purposes of sentencing pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522. This
same argument has previously been considered and rejected in State v. Durham, 146
ldaho 364,366, 195 P.3d 723,726 (Ct. App. 2008). And there was good reason for the
Court of Appeals to reject this claim.
Generaily, when a statute anci a court rile deal with the same subject matie: and
share a common purpose, this Court reads the two provisions in conjunction with one
another. The case law regarding the sua sponte duty of the district court reflects this
principle through analyzing the provisions of I.C.R. 32(d) in conjunction with I.C. § 192522. Craner, 137 ldaho at 189, 45 P.3d at 845. See also Collins, 144 ldaho at 409,

162 P.3d at 788; State v. McFarland, 125 ldaho 876, 881, 876 P.2d 158, 163 (Ct. App.
1994); State v. Pearson, 108 ldaho 889, 890-892, 702 P.2d 927, 928-930 (Ct. App.
1985). This Court similarly reads statutes and ldaho court rules in conjunction with one
another in other contexts involving criminal trials or sentencing where the statute and
the court rule deal with the same subject matter. See, e.g., Murillo v. State, 144 ldaho
449, 452, n.l, 163 P.3d 238, 241 (Ct. App. 2007) (recognizing co-extensive right to an
interpreter in both statute and court rule); State v. Dorsey, 139 ldaho 149, 150-51, 75
P.3d 203, 204-205 (Ct. App. 2003) (recognizing legal sufficiency of an information as
being governed by both statute and court rule); State v. Pole, 139 ldaho 370, 372, 79
P.3d 729, 731 (Ct. App. 2003) (citing to both statute and court rule for standards of
probable cause hearing). This is also in accord with Idaho's well-established rule of
statutory construction that statutes relating to the same subject matter are to be
construed together. See, e.g., State v. Callaghan, 143 ldaho 856, 858, 153 P.3d 1202,
1204 (Ct. App. 2006).
Courts interpreting the duty of the district court to order a mental health
evaluation sua sponfe focus directly on the mandatory language included in I.C. § 192522.

See Craner, 137 ldaho at 189, 45 P.3d at 845. It is the plain language of

I.C. § 19-2522 stating that the district court "shall appoint" a psychiatrist or psychologist
to obtain a mental health evaluation, read in conjunction with the provisions of
I.C.R. 32(d), that creates an independent duty on the part of the court to order a mental
health evaluation under certain circumstances. Sfafe v. Coonfs, 137 ldaho 150, 152153, 44 P.3d 1205, 1207-1208 (Ct. App. 2002). In fact, the court in Coonts appears to
root the sua sponte duty of the district court to order a mental health evaluation entirely

in the mandatory language of I.C.

3

19-2522, finding that "frustrations with defense

counsel's lack of diligence do not, however, excuse the trial court from compliance with
I.C. § 19-2522." Id. at 153, 44 P.3d at 1208.
As stated by the court in Craner, "The legal standards governing the court's
decision whether to order a psychological evaluation and report are contained in
I.C. § 19-2522." Craner, 137 ldaho at 189, 45 P.3d at 845; see also Collins, 144 ldaho
at 409, 162 P.3d at 788. Moreover, if there was sufficient evidence before the district
court to determine that the defendant's mental condition would be a factor at
sentencing, and the information before the district court does not satisfy the
requirements of I.C. § 19-2522, this constitutes a manifest disregard of the provisions of
I.C.R. 32(d). Craner, 137 ldaho at 190-191, 45 P.3d at 846-847. This is in accord with
other decisions interpreting the provisions of I.C. § 19-2522(3) as providing the specific
content to which a psychological report must conform to be within the proper exercise of
the court's discretion under I.C.R. 32(d). See, e.g., Collins, 144 ldaho at 409, 162 P.3d
at 788; McFarland, 125 ldaho at 881, 876 P.2d at 163; Pearson, 108 ldaho at 890-892,
702 P.2d at 928-930. Applying the relevant case law, the question of compliance with
the provisions of I.C.

3

19-2522 is inextricably intertwined with the analysis regarding

whether the district court acted in manifest disregard of the provisions of I.C.R. 32(d).
Here, the relevant issue involves the district court's discretion, and the statutory
requirements that are attendant upon that discretion, with regard to mental health
evaluations. I.C.R. 32(d) provides in relevant part that the decision as to whether to
order a psychological evaluation is to be made by the sentencing judge. While it is
within the discretion of the district court to order a psychological evaluation for purposes

of sentencing, the legislature has placed constraints on the proper exercise of that
discretion through enacting I.C. § 19-2522. Under certain circumstances - that being
where there is reason to believe that the mental condition of the defendant will be a
factor at sentencing and where the information already before the district court does not
meet with the requirements of I.C. ?j19-2522(3) -the legislature has made it mandatory
that the district court exercise its discretion under 1.C.R 32(d) in favor of obtaining a
mental health evaluation and the failure to do so constitutes manifest disregard. See
Sfafe v. Craner, 137 Idaho 188, 189-191,45 P.3d 844, 845-847(Ct. App. 2002).
To the extent that the State argues to the contrary in this case, the State's
arguments are belied by the relevant case law governing when the district court has a
sua sponte duty to order a mental health evaluation for use at sentencing. Under a
proper evaluation of this claim, the district court erred when it failed to sua sponfe order
a mental health evaluation for purposes of sentencing in this case. (See Appellant's
Brief, pp.7-13.)

CONCLUSION
Ms. Schultz respectfully requests that this Court vacate her sentence and
remand this case to district court for resentencing after a complete evaluation of her
mental condition is made in compliance with I.C. § 19-2522.

In the alternative,

Ms. Schultz asks that this Court vacate the district court's order relinquishing jurisdiction
and remand this case for further proceedings. Alternatively, she requests that this Court
reduce her sentence as it deems appropriate.
DATED this 5thday of March, 2010.

Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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